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Abstract 
We find a simple, partially altruistic mechanism that can increase global gain for 
a community of selfish agents. The mechanism is implied in the phenomena found in 
the minority game. We apply the mechanism to a two-road traffic system to maximise 
traffic flow. 
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One of the central problems in many social and biological systems is how the 
global waste of resources by a community of agents can be reduced to a minimum. 
Recently, the minority game [1], inspired by the El Farol bar problem [2], was 
introduced to capture certain essential and general features of competition between 
adaptive agents. It has been shown that the global average gain can be larger than that of 
a random process only if there is enough information available to all agents [3]. 
Nevertheless, in real systems such as financial markets, it is more often the case that 
information is limited in comparison with the number of agents involved. Here we show 
that, even when the available information is limited, a global average gain larger than 
that in a random process can be achieved as long as a small but sufficient portion of 
agents promises to make a sacrifice – to act without considering its own benefit. The 
application of this finding to increasing the traffic flow in a two-road system is then 
discussed. 
 The minority game consists of N agents going to either room A or B based on 
predicting a strategy chosen from their S strategies. The room with the smaller number 
of agents is the winning room, and every agent in the winning room is awarded one 
point. All strategies with the correct prediction (of which room will win) also score one 
point. Each agent chooses his or her highest-score strategy each time. A strategy is 
actually a list of many entries, each prescribing which room to go to according to the 
information gathered from previous experiences. The standard minority game assumes 
that the information available to all agents is the winning history of the previous M 
(memory) time steps; thus, there are M2  entries in each strategy. The history is then 
updated according to the current outcome of every time step. 
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 Consider that N is large. If no one uses a strategy, that is, everyone randomly 
chooses a room, then the time sequence of the number of people in room A will form a 
binomial distribution centred at 0.5N with the standard deviation 4/N=σ . The 
average of the difference between 0.5N and the number of people in room A is about 
4/8.08.0 N=σ  [4], and the average score by this amount would be less than 0.5N. 
Thus, the smaller σ  is, the larger the global average gain. We calculate the average gain 
for a random process of the minority game to be N/4.05.0 − . This average gain 
approaches 0.5 when N is large. 
 It is beyond question that people use strategies in games. Once a person has used 
a “good” strategy and fared better than the rest, it is certain that others will begin to 
develop their own “good” strategies. In a situation with limited information, however, it 
will soon be discovered that the average gain is less than when no one uses a strategy. 
The situation is much like that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma [5,6], in which each agent 
makes the best choice for him or herself but ends up with bad results for both agents. In 
Fig. 1, we plot the time sequence of the number of people in room A for the process in 
which everyone uses his or her best strategy, which is updated at each time step, to 
make a decision. Apparently, the small value of the average gain in this case is due to 
large splits at the beginning and end of every 12 +M  interval of the time steps. We 
explained recently [7] that this quasi-periodic structure is due to the form of the payoff 
function and the way in which everyone uses his or her strategy. In the case of a large 
number of agents, one way to raise the long-term global average gain is to introduce a 
learning mechanism [1], by which bad performers partially replace their strategies with 
better ones, or certain genetic adaptation schemes whereby each agent modifies parts of 
his or her bad strategies based on better ones [8]. Here we show two ways of achieving 
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a high global average gain in the standard minority game  – all agents continue to use 
their best strategies from among the S strategies they selected at the beginning of the 
game without modifying or substituting them. 
 First, assume that every agent is reluctant to change strategy unless there is 
another at hand that has proved to be much better – having gained 1>>l  points more 
than the current one. In this conservative community, the reluctance to switch to another 
strategy offers strong stability against variation. As a result, the number of people in 
room A gradually grows closer to N/2 so that the global gain increases. One might think 
the reason for this is that a strategy with predictions distributed more evenly between 
rooms A and B will score better and thus be favoured. However, this is not true. We 
have found that when the number of agents converges to N/2 as time goes on, the 
variance of the number of predictions in room A for all of the best strategies remains 
more or less constant. What really occurs is that, because the winning sequence is 
generally set according to the persistent use of strategies, there are only a few agents 
who change strategies at each time step, which means that the variance of the 
predictions hardly changes. At the same time, the act of switching to a new strategy 
increases by a small amount the number of agents in the winning room when the same 
pattern occurs again, thus bringing the number of agents in that room closer and closer 
to N/2. Consequently, the global average gain increases as time goes on (see the curve 
indicated by conservative in Fig. 2). As we have pointed out in our previous work [9], 
the crucial factor in reducing population variance is to decrease the number of agents 
who switch strategies at the same time. The simplest way to accomplish this is to allow 
only a certain number of agents to switch strategies at a given time [9]. In a real system, 
such as the stock market, such a limitation measure would be totally unacceptable to 
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agents. However, we have found that a society of conservative agents automatically 
reduces the number of simultaneous switches. The method works when agents are 
conservative only at the beginning – before their first strategy switch. In a simulation, 
we allow one of an agent’s strategies to have l points and the others to have 0 points at 
the beginning [10,11], and the game is played as usual – all agents use their highest-
score strategy each time. To understand why this method works, let us consider the 
simplest case of S = 2. There are at least l time steps before the first strategy switch is 
made. During this period, because everyone’s favourite strategy is chosen randomly at 
the beginning, the score differences between the two strategies disperse among agents, 
and their distribution is given approximately by a normal distribution centred at l. The 
probability of the score difference being zero is small because it is at one tail of a 
normal distribution. This can be compared with the case of a standard game (l = 0) in 
which the probability of the score difference being zero is at the maximum of a normal 
distribution. It is clear that, according to the rule of using the highest-score strategy, a 
switch can be made at one particular time step only when the score difference between 
the two strategies of a given agent was zero at the previous time step. Consequently, 
switching probability is greatly reduced when l is large. 
      There is a second method of increasing global gain that works without requiring 
agents to be conservative. Suppose the prediction of each entry in every strategy has a 
5.0≤p  probability of being 0 (room A) and (1-p) of being 1 (room B) [12,13]. A 
random prediction means 5.0=p . Now, choose p to be slightly smaller than 0.5, for 
example, 0.4825, in a case with 8=M  and 2=S . A typical time sequence for people 
in room A is shown in Fig. 3. We see that after a short period of time, the variation of 
this sequence begins to decrease so that the global average gain increases (see the curve 
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indicated by partially altruistic in Fig. 2). Now, let us consider p to be the percentage of 
0s in all entries of the strategies. Suppose that 3.5% of agents always choose room B, 
and the rest use their best strategies as usual [14]. This is equivalent to setting 
4825.0=p  ((1-0.035)/2 = 0.4825). In this way, the mechanism does not require that all 
agents behave in the same particular way, for example, by acting conservatively. What 
we need is for a small portion of agents to act unselfishly (to forgo their best strategies 
so that their behaviour is considered to be altruistic); then, the global gain improves in a 
self-organised manner. Compared to the first method, this mechanism is more likely to 
operate in real situations, either because of the altruistic behaviour of some agents 
(which has been observed in many biological species) or because of the careful 
arrangements of the game coordinator (such as government). 
 Two stages are required for the second mechanism to produce the result shown 
in Fig. 3. First, the average number of people in room A has to shift upward from pN to 
become closer to N/2. Second, the time sequence reduces its standard deviation as time 
goes on. The reason the average value shifts upward is as follows [7]. In the first M2  
time steps, room A always wins. Thus, at the end of M2  time steps, the strategies that 
have the most 0s score best and will be used in the following time steps. The average 
number of 0s for each agent’s best strategies is larger than the average of all strategies, 
which is pM2 . Therefore, the average number of people in room A shifts upward [7]. If 
this shift is well-adjusted [15] – for the subsequent time steps, room A has about a 50% 
chance of winning – then, because these best strategies have already accumulated more 
points than the others, the situation at time step 12 +M  is similar to that in the first 
method in which each agent is initially biased in favour of one strategy. Consequently, 
the standard deviation of the time sequence begins to decrease. 
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It is worth mentioning that the mechanisms work even better when S is larger. 
When S is larger, the average gain will be smaller if everyone uses his or her best 
strategy in the standard game. However, the average gain can still be brought very close 
to 0.5 if a small but sufficient number of people [16] promise to make a sacrifice. It is 
also important that the mechanism works for the whole range of values of NM /2=ρ  
(see Fig. 4). The effect of the gain-increasing mechanism is most efficient in the small 
ρ  case in which global gain is low in the standard game.  
     The partially altruistic mechanism described above can be employed in a two-
road traffic system. There are two express highways running from south to north in 
Taiwan. People who work in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, normally drive south to their 
parents’ homes or recreation destinations on the first day of a long holiday and drive 
back north on the last day. Traffic jams are a nightmare for everyone, and thus the good 
choice of a highway from the two available is crucial to the holiday mood. 
Highway traffic flow has been extensively studied [17]. Recently, the cellular 
automata approach [18] has obtained a number of interesting results. The fundamental 
diagram in traffic models is the plot of traffic flow as a function of vehicle density. A 
typical fundamental diagram shows that traffic flow reaches a maximum at a certain 
vehicle density and that the curve as a function of density is concave-upward. Thus, for 
a system with two similar roads, as in the case of Taiwan, the total traffic flow would be 
maximal when vehicles are distributed evenly on both. The problem of maximising 
traffic flow in a two-road system is therefore similar to maximising the global average 
gain in the minority game, which aims to distribute agents evenly in two rooms. 
Assume that every driver has a few strategies for determining which road to take, and 
that on every occasion he or she chooses the strategy that most often correctly predicted 
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the road with the better flow in the past [19]. According to the second mechanism 
discussed above, one possible way of obtaining a better traffic flow for a given number 
of vehicles  is to have a few percent [16] drivers choose the same highway every time, 
either voluntarily or by design.  
 
 Are those who do not adopt a strategy really sacrificing anything? In our 
simulation, they gain no less in the long run. What they have really sacrificed is the 
freedom to choose. 
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Figure captions 
Fig. 1 
Time sequence of the population in room A in the standard minority game for 
10001=N , 8=M , and 2=S . The central line shows the position of 0.5N. A quasi-
periodic structure can be readily seen. At the ends of each quasi-periodic interval, the 
population has a large deviation from the central line. 
 
Fig. 2 
The average gain of each 12 +M  time step as a function of time. Naïve (dots): no agent 
uses a strategy; Selfish (diamonds): every agent uses his of her best strategy; 
Conservative (crosses): agents are reluctant to change strategies at the beginning by 
giving l = 30 points more to one strategy; partially altruistic (circles): 3.5% of agents 
ignore their best strategies and make constant choices ( 10001=N , 8=M , 2=S ). 
 
Fig. 3 
When 3.5% of agents always choose room B and the others use their best strategies, the 
number of people in room A converges to N/2 as time goes on. The lower short line 
shows the position at 0.4825N ( 10001=N , 8=M , 2=S ). 
 
Fig. 4 
Global average gain as a function of NM /2=ρ  (M = 8, S = 2). The results for the 
partially altruistic case (solid curve) are always better than those for the naïve (random) 
case (dotted) or the selfish case (circled). The latter shows a maximum at some ρ  and is 
better than the naïve case only when ρ  is large enough. (The results are the average of 
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30 samples of random initial strategies. For each sample, we ran M250 ⋅  time steps and 
collected the data of the last 12 +M  time steps for the average.)  
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